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Abstract  
 The use of information technology to manage patient consent is an important emerging area of 
research in health data management.  This paper identifies literature, technological advances and 
current thinking on electronic consent (eConsent).  Key issues for health care providers (HCP) and 
consumers are distilled through a content analysis of a cross section of news report for the year June 
2005 to May 2006. For the study we selected countries that are in the process of adopting shared 
electronic health records, and took the approach of using media analysis. The press is a professional 
critic as defined by Sauer and Wilcox (2007). 
 
The topic of electronic consent (eConsent) is closely aligned with issues of information privacy and 
related legislation, patient rights, and national culture.  Clearly, technology is central to the 
implementation of eConsent and there are pressing management and security iss es to be addressed.  
This paper will make clear the relationships between these fields of study and comment on the ‘state of 
play’ in integrated electronic health record systems today, outlining potential pitfalls. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade the collection, storage and use of individual health and medical data has become 
increasingly computerized, with the result that it can be collated, stored, analyzed and distributed in 
unprecedented quantities and put to diverse uses (Manning, 1995).  Health insurers, for example, can 
not only tap patient data for claims payment, they use it for utilization review, underwriting and 
coverage decisions.  Employers use health data to reduce their health care and workers compensation 
costs, as well as to identify employees who may be costly in he future.  Health care providers use the 
data for research, to collect reimbursement, coordinate diagnosis and treatment and conduct quality 
assurance. Clinical data repositories and management systems will likely reduce health care costs and 
improve patient care.   
 
It is in this climate that industrialized nations are seeking to develop centralized online health records 
for their citizens.  Many benefits of this approach are foreseen, but the health record, conventional 
information systems are extraordinarily hard to manage.  (Beale, 2005) put this well in his recent 
synopsis, stating that, banking and airline systems’ customers or travellers are “grossly simplified 
abstract versions of a person” by contrast, patients in a clinical system have a biological and social 
complexity far beyond that demanded of other systems.  Added to this there are quite considerable 
challenges and paradoxes inherent in health systems such as mobility of patients, multiple HCPs, and 
constant changes in technology and the law.  The work presented in this study explores the paradox of 
privacy versus the “need to know”. The electronic health record nee s to be consent based, with 
potentially fine grained privacy rules on information use, with exceptions for emergency access. 
EConsent is at the confluence of Healthcare, Information Technology and Law as illustrated in Figure 
1.  
 
Figure 1 Influences on Electronic Consent 
 
This paper draws together academic literature from the three disciplines to put forward a framework of 
issues in developing shared electronic health record systems generally, and eConsent systems in 
particular. Using this framework  a content analysis of major news and business publications is 
performed. This approach is common in the Communications literature (Andsager and Powers, 2001), 
and whilst it is not common in Information Systems research, it provides evidence to support other 
literature in the area, and an originality of this study.  The news media are charged with covering 
issues in a balanced and informative manner. These issues are framed for th  public by newspapers 
using particular language and opinions, which in turn feedback the weight of public opin on to policy 
makers. The aim of this work is to explore the media's role in public perce tion of electronic consent.  
The results of this analysis provide a snapshot of the main concerns held by the public and thus the 
hurdles facing governments and the bodies they entrust with implementing their visions of integrated 
healthcare. The paper proceeds as follows; eConsent is placed in the context of patient consent, 
legislative frameworks and Information Technology.  Global solutions to electronic health records are 
described, focusing on how interoperability and access control are achieved.  The benefits and pitfalls 
of EHRs are presented, focusing on eConsent and leading to a framework of issues which act as a lens 
for reviewing media coverage of the same.   
 
2 THE HEALTHCARE PERSPECTIVE 
 
Before discussing electronic consent, the underlying health data issue of informed consent needs to be 
addressed.  
 
















‘Informed consent’ and ‘patient consent’ are used in health care environments to describe an 
agreement that occurs between healthcare provider and consumer.  The term ‘patient consent’ means 
that a person receiving health care is willing to share personal health information and where 
appropriate to receive a course of medical treatment.  Informed consent has a very particular meaning, 
and has been the subject of some controversy. Informed consent requires that the patient is informed, 
before any request for information, or treatment, of the following: Who will access their record, how it 
will be shared, what the information will be used for, and the risks associated with the prescribed 
medical treatment or clinical trial (Galpottage & Norris, 2004).  
 
Informed consent derives from three important principles of bioethics; non-malfeasance (prohibition 
of doing harm) beneficence (the act of doing good) and autonomy (the right of c oice). In the context 
of informed consent, if a health care provider were to knowingly omit to tell a patient the 
consequences of their consent or the use to be made of their information it would be an act of 
malfeasance. By contrast, beneficence would be demonstrated in a situation where the health care 
provider took due care to ensure the patient was as informed as possible about all consequences.  
Lastly, autonomy dictates that the patient, being informed, should be allowed to make their own 
choices without undue influence or persuasion. 
 
3 LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
It is interesting to note that many countries do not have a codified law of informed consent, but rely on 
best practice and guidelines put forward in patient’s charters. However, whether encoded or not, the 
law or patients charters/ HCP guidelines cover the same areas. Broadly, these relate to the right to 
information, the right to informed consent (including the right not to be informed) the right to 
withdraw from treatment, the right to autonomy and dignity, the right to have a representative, the 
right to choose your provider and the right to privacy and confidentiality. Additionally, patients find 
themselves in situations of express consent where the fact that the patient signs a document, provides 
legal evidence that permission for the treatment or data use was given.  Alt rnatively in 
Implied consent, the patient is assumed to have been given consent by, for example, raising their 
sleeve to have blood taken. Finally there are various exclusions to the need to obtain consent.  These 
are; the case of a legal proxy, where someone gives consent on the patient’s behalf, where a patient 
has given consent by prior arrangement, or in an emergency, or under certain mental health or public 
health conditions.  For the purposes of this study we concentrate on the personal information aspects 
of informed consent.  In terms of patients rights (not restricted to any jurisdiction) these information 
aspects impact upon; the right to access medical files/medical re ords, the right to privacy and 
confidentiality (disclosure only with consent) and exception for emergency cases (unless prior refusal 
given e.g. refusal for blood transfusion). In addition to laws/charters specifically relating to health, 
there are well established data protection laws which are describ d elsewhere - see for example 
Privacy International (2002). 
 
4 THE IMPACTS OF TECHNOLOGY ON CONSENT 
 
Management of consent to access medical records has been impacted by developments in electronic 
health records.  An electronic health record is supposed to be a repository of information regarding a 
person’s health status in computerized form which can be stored and transmitted securely.  According 
to ISO/TC215 WG1 its “primary purpose is the support of continuing efficient and quality integrated 
health care and it contains information that is retrospective, concurre t and prospective”.  This level of 
computerization provides an opportunity for both HCPs and patients to clearly identify their needs and 
preferences with respect to privacy and access to their own health records. 
 
Much work has been done to put consent into action in information systems through the concept of 
eConsent.  There are increasingly well developed models of the eCons nt data structure or eCo 
(Coiera & Clarke, 2004; O'Keefe, Greenfield, & Goodchild, 2005; O’Keefe t al., 2002).  Three issues 
emerge from the development of these models; information sharing, granularity of the consent 
concept, and support for consent as a dynamic changing process. 
 
The trust relationship between provider and consumer in most eCo prototy es is assumed to assist 
information sharing. In order to provide comprehensive health care, much patient data must be shared 
between nurses, and physicians in both primary and secondary care, and test results ne d to flow freely 
between these and other HCPs. 
 
In the eCo literature, consent is modelled to a finer granularity than legislative models have yet 
achieved, for example, whilst a patient has a right to choose their provider it is not a right to decide 
which provider sees which part of your record and for what purpose, thi  is clearly due to the need for 
legal concepts to be tested and made law, if indeed it is possible to legislat  at this level.    
 
Four different levels of “opt-in” are modelled: General denial, general denial and inclusions, general 
consent and exclusions, and general consent.  These have profound effects on the balance between 
clinical access and patient privacy. The relationship between informati n and consent is illustrated as a 
full set of dimensions below. 
 
Access to <information> 
By an <entity>  
for a <purpose> 
in a <context> 
is {consented to| denied} 
 




An eCo exists as a data structure attached to a health record, which could be converted to XML and 
transmitted with the record if necessary.  The system that manages the eCo could operate in a number 
of ways for example it could be through a "gatekeeper systems" which blocks unauthorized 
individuals from accessing information, an "audit system" which allows unrestricted access, but 
obtrusively records all accesses where the individual must be prepared to assert that their access is 
justified or a "Passive Record".  The passive record would fulfil all legal requirements described here, 
by simply recording in a text file the nature of consent agreements, but they are ineffective in a 
distributed environment. In a distributed system the eCo follows the EHR around and the currency of 
its linkage to the record has to be managed.   
 
Reflecting that consent is not a static process, an eCo is programmed to expire after a given time. 
 
Another initiative pioneered in the US by NEC (2006) is the use of tablet PCs, with electronic consent 
forms, to gather and store electronically, consent information from patients. The system developed by 
NEC is called PersonalPass and is designed to make administration of consent and HIPAA forms 
easier.  In terms of the classification laid out above, such systems are a passive record, in that they are 
really no different than a digitized form, except that they have certain integrity constraints on entry 
which assure the quality of the data entered.  The relevance of this work to the current work is that this 
type of electronic consent supports consent for clinical intervention in particular, whereas the eCo 
structure is designed primarily to support consent to access data. 
  
5.1 Global solutions to informed consent and health information access control – Canada, 
NZ, Australia, UK and USA  
 
5.1.1 Sharable lifelong health records 
 
The lifelong shareable health record is becoming an accepted concept the world over. Many countries 
are investing large amounts of money in national systems to with the aim of improving health care. As 
part of the United Kingdom’s National Programme for Information Technology (NPfIT) initiative 
(Currie & Guah, 2006) a database is being installed which will allow healthcare providers to access a 
patient's records wherever they are. The aim is to connect ev ry family doctor and hospital in England, 
and provide online records for 50 million patients by 2010.  
 
In Canada a shareable centralized health record is being develop d by Canada health Infoway (2006). 
The blueprint for and electronic health record solution produced by Infoway is highly regarded, and 
has positioned Canada as a world leader in Electronic Health Record Management (Hovenga, Garde, 
& Heard, 2005) 
 
In Australia an initiative with the same aim “HealthConnect” (2006) is underway. Health connect is 
slated to come with smart card technology whereby secure access to health connect can be provided.  
The Health connect system combines a plethora of medical record databases 
(community/diagnostic/general practice and tertiary levels)  into one ce tral network (Grain, 2003). 
 
Almost all general practices in New Zealand and computerized and most practices  (93.7%) connect to 
a system called HealthLink, so they have the capability of transferring data electronically (Didham, 
Martin, Wood, & Harrison, 2004). They use HealthLink's secure system to electronically exchange 
sensitive patient data such as test results, discharge summaries and referrals. New Zealand benefits 
from two decades of a patient master index, rather than a unique Health ID number, which allows 
records to be more readily shared between providers.  It already has a nationwide health data network 
and an adverse medical reaction system. Web portal technologies are in t lled in 60% of New Zealand 
hospitals 
 
In the US, the department of health and human service is planning the design and development of a 
National Health Information Network (NHIN) to facilitate exchange of health care information 
nationwide while protecting patient privacy.  In early 2005 500 proposals for the NHIN were received.  
Four teams were picked to prototype the NHIN in late 2005, it is planned that these systems are in 
production by the end of 2006 (Kaushal, Bates, Poon, Jha, & al, 2005). 
 
5.1.2 Information Access Control 
 
The confidentiality of personal information shared with a clinician in the context of treatment is a 
fundamental obligation in the provision of health care services.  The clinician must also have consent 
of the patient to share that information with a third party.  As health care providers adopt integrated 
systems based on internet technology for information exchange, it b comes increasingly difficult to 
honour this obligation. As personal health information is exchanged with an increasing number of 
stakeholders, there is a risk that information being accessed in ways for which the patient had not 
given consent.  Practices such as emailing health information are quite common, but clinicians are 
becoming increasingly uncomfortable with this, many expressing the need for health information to go 
straight into their databases (O'Keefe, Greenfield, & Goodchild, 2005) 
 
In setting up such systems developers need to contemplate how much centralization is acceptable to 
stakeholders. In a fully centralized system such as NPfIT consent management is simplified, but there 
are perceived privacy risks and performance issues, leaving it decentralized leaves consent 
management to the consumer. However, to mitigate this responsibility, default policies can be set up.  
With a decentralized system, such as the system described in O’Keefe et al. (2002, 2005) as health 
records are transferred between facilities the eConsent record becomes part of the health record. 
Clearly this establishes an imperative to manage this additional health data and its currency at all sites 
where it is downloaded.  This is done by means of a “placeholder” which identifies which parts of the 
record can be seen by whom and for what purpose, and which travels with the record.  The NPfIT 
solution involves an analogous solution the “sealed envelope” where parts of the record can only be 
seen in emergencies. The default is for HCPs to see a summary record only which will only contain 
data on major diagnoses, surgical procedures, allergies and prescriptions, which some have criticized 
as less than useful (Bostock, 2005).  The main healthcare provider can see the whole record. 
5.1.3 Benefits of Shared Electronic Health Records 
 
Nations campaigning to adopt national electronic health records recognize potential advantages, to the 
consumer of health care these include; more rapid and easier access to care, smoother transitions 
between primary and secondary care, definite appointment slots at convenient times and shorter waits, 
more control for over who can access their health information and active participation in decisions 
about their health care.  The benefits suggested for providers ar ; rapid diagnosis and discharge, 
seamless support in the community after discharge, avoidance of unnecessary testing and more time to 
devote to direct care.   For those who seek to measure and manage outcomes there is the opportunity to 
reduce medical errors, improve quality of care, improve patient compliance, lower transaction costs 
for outpatient testing and prescriptions and reduce variability in clinical care.  From a public health 
point of view there shared health records allow for improvement in health through real-time disease 
surveillance and monitoring, and by extension to bioterrorism, such records can bolster homeland 
security.  For administrators there will be rapid access to vital and accurate health information, greater 
portability of health records for an increasingly mobile population and reduced duplication of services. 
 
5.1.4 Issues in shared electronic health records 
 
Previous authors (Grain, 2003) have noted the following problems; the issue of how health 
professionals access to records should be managed, how individuals can limit access to their own 
records or identify the appropriate circumstances for those records to be accessed, and whether health 
professionals are aware of the level of access they reall have.  This issue was foreshadowed earlier in 
the paper with the description of summary versus full records and the exception for emergencies 
which is solved differently depending on the level of centralization of the record.  At a macro level 
health record sharing is impacted by different government regulation, different cultures and differing 
attitudes to information privacy (Sandhu, 2006).  Further, the level of opt-in patients should be given 
by default is frequently questioned in the literature (Edwards, 2005 ; Kaushal, Bates, Poon, Jha, & al, 
2005).  One reason for this, is that data protection laws can have a severe impact on epidemiological 
studies (Breen, 2001 ; Magnusson, 2002 ; Vedig & Vedig, 2002 ).  If researchers were required to get 
explicit consent from patients every time their data was to be used, the whole process would grind to a 
halt.  Recently (Iversen, Liddell, Fear, Hotopf, & Wessely) described this issue in the context of 
research on the health of military personnel.  Frequently, authors comment on how our current 
understanding about the links between smoking and lung cancer would not have been possible had 
data protection laws been as strict in the 1950s and 60s.  There is a clear need for standards in health 
records, to facilitate interoperability(Hovenga, Garde, & Heard, 2005), and these include standards for 




The study focuses on a calendar year of stories derived from Factiva (2006) for the period from May 
2005 to April 2006.  Five OECD countries ensconced in development of natinal heath data networks 
were selected for comparison.  Initially the following query was used.  
 
(consent or eConsent or ("access control")) and (data or ehr) and ns=GHEA  and rst=TMNB 
and(re=AUSTR or re=UK or re=CANA or re=USA or re=NZ) 
 
The above search queries stories from the healthcare area in major news and buiness publications.  
This resulted in a total of 357 stories.  Due to the small number of publications from Canada, NZ and 
Australia the search was widened to include all publications from these regions this resulted in 426 
stories. On analysis a large number of these stories (85) related to specific drug trials and for each 
country particular issues came to the fore that were irrelevant for the purposes of this study.  For 
example In New Zealand much debate raged on the topic of meningococcal infections, whereas in the 
UK a story about an eye surgeon who had done a study without first gathering the patients’ consent 
dominated the headlines.  Stories relating to costs were excluded these formed a large part of the 
debate in the US. A total of 268 stories were deemed irrelevant, leaving a usable pool of 73 stories.  
NZ did not appear in this selection. It appears integration is not a key issue in NZ today. Perhaps 
surprisingly for a small country New Zealand has an advanced health IT infrastructure. Thus it is 
excluded from the discussion at this point.   We used both traditional content analysis and a computer 
assisted content analysis program, Termine (2008).Two coders looked at each s ory and identified the 
main areas of coverage by source and by country and classified based on issues identified from the 
academic literature; Smartcard security, Opt in, Confidentiality, Research, Standards, the use of a 
“sealed envelope” for emergency access, and access control.   The articles were read thoroughly to 
examine evidence for the use of themes identified and to search for new themes or frames that may 
have been overlooked.  The results of this initial analysis are illustrated in Table 1. 
 
 





Confidentiality Research Gene Envelope RMC* Systems Total 
Australia 1 2 5 1 1   4 14 
Canada    5     5 
UK 4 3 6 11 1 4 3 6 38 
USA  14 1 1     16 
 5 19 12 18 2 4 3 10 73 
Table 1  Breakdown of News Stories 
In addition to these elements in Table 1 the column labelled RMC* refers to a particular issue 
evolving in the UK as demand for care outstrips supply, strategies to manage demand have evolved 
involving. telephone help lines, computer based decision support systems, and practitioner-led triage 
systems which together comprise the RMC concern has arisen that thousands of GPs who refer via 
these centres risk legal action or being struck off if they fail to warn patients that data will be seen by a 
third party.  
7 RESULTS 
A great deal of concern arose from smartcard security, particul rly following a highly publicized trial 
of the same in Tasmania Australia, related to this issues of confidentiality arose around smartcard 
access in Australia, and around the summary record in the UK, which is still thought to be too readily 
accessible by many.  The level of opt-in or opt-out provided by default raised some interest as did the 
related issue of the damaging effects on epidemiological research of stringent privacy and consent 
laws.   The “sealed envelope” and the possibility of overriding consent in an emergency were of 
interest, and finally some concern was expressed over storage of netic information in shared 
database systems.  Ten of the stories described the systems in place in the various countries of the 
study.   This prompted a more fine grained analysis using the systems themselves as the search criteria 




Country Query No of Results Most frequently cited issue 
Australia "healthconnect" and rst=TMNB 
and re=AUSTR 
41 Confidentiality 
USA National Health Information 
Network and rst=TMNB and 
re=USA  
12 Standards 
UK NPfIT and rst=TMNB and 
re=UK  
23 Confidentiality 
Canada “Canada health infoway” and 
rst=TMNB and re=cana  
3 Interoperability/Standards 
Table 2 Summary of stories on e-Health Initiatives   
 
8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The UK project NPfIT is often cited as the world’s largest civil IT project, it is drawing much 
publicity and interest around the world.  As a result of the decision to centralize the records, much fear 
of breaches confidentiality and loss of control is being fuelled.  The issue of consent here is how much 
of the patients records should be seen and by whom.  A default situation is in place where a summary 
record can be seen by all, but the full record only by the key health provider patients can opt to have 
their records put on the data “spine” in the first place or not. In all countries contemplating shareable 
lifelong health records standards and interoperability are an issue thi  seems to be more pressing in the 
US, perhaps due to the diversity of the systems and the physical and political separation of the states. 
These issues are not directly of concern in eConsent, however eCons nt should be of concern when 
setting such standards, so that an eCo can readily be attached to any records that emerge.  The ability 
to access records in an emergency is important, this is one of th exceptions to consent outlined in the 
discussion on legislation.  
We live in an interesting time with respect to health records, whilst a shared record holds the promise 
of better and more efficient health care, it also introduces privacy and security concerns.  Adoption of 
standards by nations is seriously impacted by the prevailing legislation which is in turn affected by 
culture.  Identifying and mitigating these cultural differences is the subject for further work. 
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